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Moynihan and the Neocons
Greg Weiner
In his  biogr a ph y  of Norman Podhoretz, Thomas Jeffers re-ports that one St. Patrick’s Day — Podhoretz could not recall the 
year — United States senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan alighted unan-
nounced on his old friend’s Manhattan doorstep to offer an accounting 
of himself. The precise content of the conversation is unrecorded, but 
tension over Moynihan’s senatorial record — on policy toward the 
Soviets especially — was generally understood to have strained the men’s 
years-long friendship.
Today, more than a generation after that encounter, and more than a 
decade after the senator’s death, many neoconservatives still want an ac-
counting from Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Their dispositions are at once 
admiring and aggravated; the intellectual kinship is often celebrated, 
though sometimes mixed with accusations of ideological betrayal. I 
was at a recent conference of political scientists, presenting a paper on 
Moynihan, when one audience member, perfectly pleasant and seem-
ingly admiringly disposed toward the scholar-statesman, exclaimed: 
“Reagan could have used Moynihan’s help, but he didn’t get it because 
Moynihan liked being a senator!” The accusation is not uncommon. 
Neither is the underlying assumption: Moynihan was one of us, but his 
politics trumped his principles.
Yet the veracity of the charge hinges on to whom the “us” refers. 
Some tenets of neoconservatism — at least as its “godfather,” Irving 
Kristol, elucidated it — reasonably describe Moynihan. But Moynihan 
always rejected “neoconservatism” as a label, and what neoconserva-
tism eventually became, a political movement, never enticed him. He 
always felt that the goals that he did share with Kristol — what Kristol 
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described as a “conservative welfare state” that rejected the Great Society 
model, for example, appears to be close to what Moynihan understood 
to be the ethic of the New Deal — were properly described as liberal.
And a liberal is what Moynihan was through and through: a New 
Dealer for whom the Democratic Party was as much a Burkean pla-
toon politically as his local Catholic parish was ethnically. His essential 
principles remained unchanged between the first ballot he cast in the 
basement of St. Raphael’s Church in Hell’s Kitchen in 1948 and the last 
vote he cast in the chamber of the United States Senate 52 years later. The 
pandemonium of the 1960s distressed but never disillusioned him — a 
distinction that is decisive for understanding why he declined to join 
the neoconservative defection from the Democratic Party. Moynihan, a 
self-aware thinker entitled to self-description, resisted the neoconserva-
tive label with emphatic consistency.
And yet: Some of his most important writings were published in the 
pages of The Public Interest, including on the cover of its first issue half a 
century ago. Some of his most cherished friends and intellectual part-
ners were named Kristol, Himmelfarb, Podhoretz, and Decter. Some 
of his closest aides — Elliott Abrams, Checker Finn — enlisted in the 
Reagan revolution. Moynihan was a fervent anti-totalitarian, an impas-
sioned defender of Israel, and a career-long welfare reformer. His affinity 
with and appeal to neoconservatism were real.
But the claim of a conversion of convenience — that Moynihan the neo-
con intellectual became Moynihan the New York liberal in order to retain 
his Senate seat — is belied by the clear evidence of Moynihan’s liberalism in 
the public record well before he took the senatorial oath in 1977. This is not 
to say he never changed his mind, but the only truly major change — his 
evolution regarding U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union (not a small mat-
ter, to be sure) — is much more explicable by shifting information than by 
crass politics. But Moynihan’s consistency is more difficult to see because 
the character of American liberalism changed around him. Moynihan’s 
singular strain of liberalism — what I have called “Burkean liberalism,” a 
liberalism of locality and limitation — renders him inescapably vulnerable 
to co-optation. These elements of his thought constitute a woven figure 
that cannot be undone if he is to be coherently understood. If its Burkean 
and liberal components are detached, Moynihan easily appears to belong 
to either the traditionally conservative or conventionally liberal camps, 
rather than being properly located on his own distinctive ground.
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Ultimately, of course, understanding Moynihan’s thought on its own 
terms is more important than choosing which label to give it. But there 
is something in a name, and something in the fact that Moynihan so 
emphatically resisted this one. That may have to do with the evolution 
of neoconservatism from an intellectual current in its exile years to a 
political power in its ascendant period. Moynihan’s dispute was not so 
much with the ideas of the gifted New York circle of intellectuals who 
became the neoconservatives, though such disputes would emerge. It 
was with the fact that, as he put it in 1988, they had “gone over” — having 
concluded that these principles would be best pursued in the Republican 
Party. This Moynihan never accepted.
What is  neoconservatism?
In 1976, the year Moynihan was first elected to the Senate, Irving Kristol 
set forth five principles of neoconservatism. Moynihan at this point had 
been a prominent public intellectual for over a decade. It is as likely that 
Kristol’s neoconservatism was influenced by Moynihan’s liberalism as the 
other way around; almost certainly the reality is that the men influenced 
each other. In any case, the mere fact of compatibility between their ideas 
does not prove that Moynihan was a neoconservative any more than it 
proves that Kristol was a liberal. But some likenesses are striking.
First, Kristol argued that “[n]eoconservatism is not at all hostile to 
the idea of a welfare state, but it is critical of the Great Society version 
of this welfare state.” The problem was that the Great Society intruded 
into subsidiary social institutions. This view, as we shall see, was entirely 
compatible with concerns Moynihan had been voicing about the Great 
Society since the mid-1960s.
The question is how to describe the welfare state that remains when 
the micromanaging superstructure of the Great Society is removed. 
Moynihan simply called it the New Deal. Kristol repeatedly described 
it as a “conservative” welfare state. Kristol, to be sure, emphasized the 
need for a fiscally sustainable welfare state; on the other hand, one of 
Moynihan’s last major bills sought to mitigate Social Security’s solvency 
crisis, including by addressing benefit growth and adding a private ac-
count, and one of his last public acts was to serve on George W. Bush’s 
Social Security commission. In his correspondence, Moynihan described 
the private Social Security accounts as a means of spreading ownership 
of assets. He never regarded this position as anything other than liberal.
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Second, Kristol stated, neoconservatives “ha[d] learned to have great 
respect” for markets and preferred, when it was necessary to interfere 
with them for social purposes, to do so within a market framework. 
Reserved judgment is the better part of prudence on this score as regards 
Moynihan; his writings do not delineate a comprehensive economic 
doctrine. He did say a guaranteed income would allow the poor to make 
their own market choices, and he lamented the “radical disjunction” 
in liberal thinking “between the production of wealth and its distri-
bution.” But it is also fair to say his Senate votes were probably more 
conventionally liberal than what Kristol had in mind.
Next, “[n]eoconservatism,” Kristol wrote, “tends to be respectful of 
traditional values and institutions: religion, the family, the ‘high culture’ 
of Western civilization.” Moynihan had been expressing this view, too, 
for a decade — including firm and principled opposition to the radical 
left of the 1960s — and understood his view as, properly speaking, the 
liberal one. He repeatedly and admiringly invoked the Catholic doctrine 
of subsidiarity, the idea that a problem should be addressed by the closest 
competent social institution; he was a lifelong crusader for the family; his 
favorite quotation of Burke was the Reflections’ “little platoons.” 
Fourth, and perhaps the greatest point of tension, Kristol said neo-
conservatism rejected “equality of condition” as “a proper goal for 
government to pursue.” Moynihan, by contrast, had said in The Negro 
Family: The Case for National Action in 1965 that equality of condition 
was the next step in the fight for racial equality. It is unclear to what 
extent Moynihan and Kristol would disagree on policy on this front, 
but certainly the rhetorical inflection differed.
Finally, “neoconservatism believes that American democracy is 
not likely to survive for long in a world that is overwhelmingly hos-
tile to American values.” Kristol noted, however, that there was only 
a “weak” consensus among neoconservatives about what precisely 
this meant. They had gone “every which way” on Vietnam, for ex-
ample, a war Moynihan had opposed. Within the broad parameters 
of this description, certainly Moynihan — again, describing himself as 
liberal — conforms to it.
The challenge of description lies in the fact that what Kristol forecast 
next did occur — but only half of it: “[I]f the political spectrum moved 
rightward and we should become ‘neoliberal’ tomorrow, I could accept 
that too.” The spectrum did move rightward, but the neoconservatives 
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did not become neoliberals, at least not as the term is usually under-
stood. Many, to Moynihan’s dismay, moved rightward with it.
Moynihan wrote in 1988: “I was by this time [1984] a bit estranged 
from a greatly gifted circle of New York writers who first came together 
in dismay at the ‘liberal’ politics of the 1960s. Many had gone over to the 
Republicans: many had entered the new administration or assertively 
supported it. I hadn’t, didn’t, wouldn’t, don’t.”
But even Kristol’s description — “neoliberal” — Moynihan likely 
would not apply to himself, for it suggests something new, a reaction to 
the 1960s that caused a mutated strain of liberalism to emerge. Moynihan 
felt his feet were planted in one place the whole time. It was the left that 
split from liberalism. The gifted circle of neoconservatives reacted to the 
“liberal” policies (the qualifying quotation marks are Moynihan’s) of 
the 1960s. Moynihan did not regard them as actually liberal. Kristol fa-
mously described a neoconservative as a liberal mugged by reality. This 
was a liberal changed, a liberal who became something else. Moynihan 
was never thus assaulted. He thought it was the New Deal that had been 
mugged — by the Great Society.
moynihan as Liber aL
We can begin to understand Moynihan’s liberalism by starting where 
he did: with ethnicity. It is too strong, but not by much, to describe his 
affinity with the Democratic Party in those terms. He used to tell stu-
dents that the most important datum in ascertaining a person’s political 
affiliation was the year he was born. Moynihan thus wrote Jane Perlez of 
the New York Times in 1983 that his “ ‘ideological roots’ [were] not, and in 
truth could not be, in the ‘neo-conservative movement.’ I am a 56 year 
old man: my ideological roots are in the Democratic party of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt.” He spoke of government as “the instrument of the com-
mon purpose” and admiringly of the New Deal as “an ethic of collective 
provision.” Moynihan would even use the “liberal” moniker for several 
dispositions other commentators might describe as conservative: what 
he called the liberal belief in “restraint” and the “persistence of sin,” for 
example; similarly, “the doctrines of liberalism are derived from experi-
ence, rather than right reason.”
Moynihan was acutely aware of the emergence of neoconser-
vatism — it engaged some of his closest intellectual and personal 
friends — but his decision not to join the revolt was equally deliberate. 
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That he was associated with the movement, often by mere dint of his 
friendships, often annoyed and sometimes amused him. In his United 
Nations memoir, A Dangerous Place, he wrote of the early to mid-1970s, 
when socialists attempted to influence the Democratic Party:
The Straussians would now presumably resume their critique 
of liberalism, allied with a point of view that was coming to be 
known as “neo-conservative,” a term that had first appeared in 
[Irving] Howe’s journal, Dissent, and was now being applied with 
no very fine distinction to persons such as Kristol, who was in-
deed one, to [Daniel] Bell, who demanded the right to remain a 
socialist, and to persons of the center such as myself, resigned to 
the fate of personifying, at one and the same time, “neoconserva-
tism” to Michael Harrington and “left-liberalism” to William F. 
Buckley, Jr.
Moynihan here described himself as a man of the “center,” but else-
where when he spoke of the center, he specified the “liberal” center. This 
liberal center — as opposed to the liberal left — subscribed to New Deal 
liberalism, not Great Society liberalism. In Moynihan’s understand-
ing, New Deal liberalism was ameliorative; Great Society liberalism 
was transformative. New Deal liberalism operated macroeconomically; 
Great Society liberalism functioned micromanagerially. The crowning 
triumph of New Deal liberalism was thus Social Security, a massive 
program of redistribution that enlisted government in its core compe-
tence of collecting funds and cutting checks, and in the process turned 
the poorest class of citizens into the wealthiest. The characteristic fail-
ure of Great Society liberalism was the Community Action Program 
Moynihan chronicled in his book Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding; 
it sought to insert the federal government into neighborhoods and to 
finance both political upheaval and social transformation.
The Great Society years inspired Moynihan’s most searching and 
systematic thinking about politics, and he wrote in Coping, his collec-
tion of essays from that era, that “[t]he Federal government is good at 
collecting revenues, and rather bad at disbursing services. Therefore, 
we should use the Federal fisc as an instrument for redistributing in-
come between different levels of government, different regions and 
different classes.” 
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The Great Society could be said to have done this in a sense, but not 
the sense one would wish. In one of his characteristic bursts of insight, 
Moynihan observed that the actual effect of the Great Society — which 
for a time taxed the poor to pay middle-class social workers to minister to 
them — was probably to redistribute income upward. Godfrey Hodgson’s 
seminal biography The Gentleman from New York recalls that Moynihan 
once told a group of Harvard students who accosted him about Nixon 
Administration education cuts that they were “defending a class interest”: 
As future teachers and education bureaucrats, they were going to receive 
the funds they sought to protect. Social workers, Moynihan noted on 
another occasion, should beware of sanctimony. It was fine for them 
to claim they chose their profession in order to do good, but they were 
also compensated for the service. Meanwhile, “[s]hoe-factory workers in 
Manchester, almost certainly earning considerably less than social work-
ers in the same city, are not permitted to declare that they have chosen 
their profession for humanitarian reasons.”
Rather than sending Moynihan searching for a new philosophy, either 
a conservatism or a neoconservatism, all this reinforced his faith in the 
old one: the basic ameliorative ethic of the New Deal. Witness his bold 
attempt to extend the insurance principle of the New Deal to the entire 
working population through the guaranteed income. To achieve this, 
he enlisted in the Nixon Administration, a move that is often misunder-
stood to reflect disenchantment with liberalism but that in fact reflects 
an immense confidence in it. That Moynihan joined forces with Nixon is 
undeniably significant but is in a larger sense also incidental to his policy 
aims. Moynihan wanted to pursue the guaranteed income — a project, 
he said afterward, of “political liberals” — and felt the Democratic Party 
was, as he put it, ideologically “exhausted” from the battles of the 1960s. 
Nixon, by contrast, was interested. James Q. Wilson would later observe 
that Moynihan served four presidents of two parties, Kennedy through 
Ford, “not because he had no views but because he persuaded the presi-
dents in each case that their views should move toward his.”
That Moynihan adhered to the basic elements of the New Deal helps 
to explain why, to the consternation of later neoconservatives, he op-
posed welfare reform in 1995 and 1996. Moynihan’s objection was not 
to the concept of reform, a goal he had pursued for decades. He had, 
in fact, authored the legislation that unleashed the much ballyhooed 
gubernatorial experiments in welfare policy. Moynihan objected to 
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repealing the federal guarantee of welfare benefits for dependent chil-
dren. This was a retreat from the New Deal — a repeal, not a reform, 
of what he saw as one of the New Deal’s greatest and most humani-
tarian achievements. Welfare reform was, to Moynihan, one more 
utopian enterprise — ironically reminiscent of the Great Society — 
accompanied by excessive promises and overly bold faith in the human 
capacity to predict the consequences of policy. “Scholars have been 
working at these issues for years now,” he implored, describing the bill 
as unconservative, “and the more capable they are, the more tentative 
and incremental their findings.”
During the course of that debate, as in earlier ones, it often fell to 
Moynihan to defend the Great Society against excessive calumnies. He 
wrote the Moynihan Report, which charted the disintegration of the 
African-American family, on the basis of datasets that preceded the first 
shot in the War on Poverty, so he had ample reason to reject claims of 
a causal connection between the Great Society and the social ills that 
followed — variations on which were occurring in all nations of the 
Atlantic world regardless of their welfare policies.
Other elements of the 1960s elicited his more explicit disgust. 
Violence became chic, words the handmaiden of will. This was no class 
revolution; it was elite anomie. “The president of Yale toyed with it,” 
he wrote; “the president of the AFL-CIO wouldn’t touch it.” Moynihan 
would later note that the platform of Students for a Democratic Society, 
the contented work of middle-class radicals, was silent on the topic of 
poverty. Though he opposed the escalating American involvement in 
Vietnam, Moynihan said he nonetheless could not “accept the great de-
basement of language and the fantasizing of politics that accompanied 
the reaction to the war.” 
But this again was a derangement of liberalism, and thus no cause for 
Moynihan to abandon the doctrine itself. Indeed, in the culture wars of 
the 1960s that so strained his patience, Moynihan likely saw a cousin to, 
if not a twin of, the conflict that dominated the politics of his youth: the 
split between the mainstream and patriotic liberalism he espoused and 
the deluded faction of Stalinist enthusiasts on the hard left.
the Liber aL anti-communist
Moynihan’s staunch opposition to communism led to perhaps his 
most striking affinity and most serious strain with the neoconservative 
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movement. As a veteran of the early battles between liberals and 
Stalinists, Moynihan knew that anti-communism was not sufficient 
to render one conservative. Moynihan and his Senate mentor, Henry 
“Scoop” Jackson of Washington state, stood in a long tradition of liber-
als who hewed simultaneously to unrelenting anti-communist and New 
Dealer beliefs. Indeed, the New Deal, many believed, had saved the 
country from having to face a significant Stalinist movement during 
the Depression years.
Moynihan first came to public attention on foreign affairs with the 
appearance of his seminal Commentary essay “The United States in 
Opposition,” which argued that the government should treat the United 
Nations General Assembly as a parliamentary body in which, as an op-
position party, America’s most powerful weapons were rhetorical. As 
ambassador to the U.N., he thus thundered away against despots like 
Idi Amin and fought the seemingly trivial but cumulatively damaging 
resolutions of the anti-American nations that assailed the supposedly 
oppressive West while denying their own illiberalism.
His first Senate address opposed the nomination of Paul Warnke to 
head the 1977 SALT negotiations. Warnke’s 1975 Foreign Policy article 
“Apes on a Treadmill” had called on the United States to disarm cer-
tain weapons systems unilaterally in the hopes of Soviet reciprocation. 
Moynihan thought this foolish. Significantly, in the course of explain-
ing himself, Moynihan reminded his colleagues of his opposition to 
the Vietnam War. He had been a board member of Americans for 
Democratic Action, he noted, and in that capacity had voted not to en-
dorse Lyndon Johnson for re-election in 1968. But he had done so because 
he perceived an expansive totalitarian threat from which the Vietnam 
War was a distraction. The war was a mistake but not an ignoble one. 
He later chastised President Carter for his national self-flagellation over 
the war: “[W]hy describe our failure in terms that make us so culpable 
rather than merely fallible?”
It was not surprising, consequently, that admirers of Moynihan 
experienced more than a bit of whiplash when, in the early 1980s, he 
began supporting a less aggressive posture toward the Soviets. Critics 
have imputed this to partisanship: Either Moynihan was tacking left to 
prevent a liberal challenge in his 1982 re-election, or he was motivated by 
animus toward Ronald Reagan. Yet a simpler explanation, more chari-
table and more in character — with external evidence as support — is 
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available: Moynihan changed his mind because new information be-
came available. In the late 1970s, demographic studies showed male life 
expectancy declining in the Soviet Union. Moynihan observed that such 
a decline was all but impossible in the modern world; something in the 
Soviet Union was going seriously wrong. “If demography is destiny,” 
Moynihan would later write, “this was a society growing ill. Or, if you 
like, breaking down.”
These considerations led Moynihan to his astonishingly prescient 
1979 prediction, printed in Newsweek, that the Soviet Union could col-
lapse along ethnic lines within a decade. By the early 1980s, the policy 
conclusion followed: Let them collapse. Attempting to accelerate the 
process — which was what Moynihan understood the Reagan policy to 
be doing — entailed actions that were prudentially and legally precari-
ous. In a 1984 commencement address at New York University, he thus 
concluded: “Our grand strategy should be to wait out the Soviet Union; 
its time is passing. Let us resolve to be here, our old selves, with an ever 
surging font of ideas. When the time comes, it will be clear that in the 
end freedom did prevail.”
During this period, Moynihan grew increasingly alarmed at what 
he characterized as the Reagan administration’s challenges to, if not 
outright violations of, international law. The CIA’s mining of the 
Nicaraguan harbors was the most flagrant example; Moynihan called it 
an act of war. The invasion of Grenada, he argued, violated the charter 
of the Organization of American States. Neoconservatives and tradi-
tional conservatives have assailed these positions, but none of them were 
new. Moynihan had supported international law as a basis of relations 
among states his entire career. As early as his doctoral dissertation at 
Tufts, which explored the rise of the International Labor Organization 
in the aftermath of World War I, he had harbored hope for the system 
of international law emanating from the Treaty of Versailles.
The year before “The United States in Opposition” appeared, he 
gave an admiring, if complex, lecture on Woodrow Wilson on the 50th 
anniversary of the 28th president’s death. Moreover, far from being a 
summons to hard-nosed realpolitik, “The United States in Opposition” 
was a call to hold critics of the West to standards of law, including the 
U.N. Charter. Nor was the invocation of international law a partisan 
tool sharpened for Reagan alone: In 1980, Moynihan had gone so far 
as to oppose President Carter’s mission to rescue the U.S. hostages in 
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Tehran on the grounds that the nation was awaiting a ruling on the situ-
ation from the International Court of Justice.
Of course, Moynihan may have been wrong in some or all of this. 
But he was not a political opportunist. A superficial dichotomy that pits 
hawks against doves in foreign policy — a dynamic assuming that some 
were tough on the Soviets, others weak — may obscure this fact. By that 
measure, Moynihan might indeed be seen to have defected from the 
hawks to the doves. Senator Frank Church made that error in reverse 
in responding to Moynihan’s Warnke speech with surprise, declaring 
that he preferred the Moynihan of a decade earlier, presumably the 
Moynihan who had opposed the Vietnam War. The suggestion was that 
one was either for war or for accommodation. But to Moynihan, one 
was either for effective and lawful opposition to totalitarianism or one 
was not. His changing votes arose not from changes in that principle 
but from changes in the facts to which it was applied.
Moynihan remained a principled defender of democracy but was 
never an advocate for assertive efforts to spread it. On the contrary, he 
explicitly warned against them:
[O]ur optimism, belief in progress, and the possibility of achiev-
ing human happiness on earth, combined with our considerable 
achievement in this respect at home, have led us to an increasingly 
dangerous and costly effort to extend our system abroad. We are 
in the grip of what Reinhold Niebuhr has called “The Myth of 
Democratic Universality. ”
Instead, the United States, he believed, should fight battles of ideas in 
ideological forums. It should maintain a posture of nuclear deterrence. 
And, once he concluded the Soviet Union was doomed, he said it should 
be allowed to die. That this latter position happened to align his votes 
with those who had always sought accommodation with the Soviets, 
even in the heyday of totalitarianism, does not suggest a realignment of 
his ideas. Michael Barone later explained: “Moynihan began voting with 
the foreign policy doves, but for different reasons: They believed that the 
Soviet Union was dangerous but not evil . . . Moynihan believed that the 
Soviet Union was evil but not dangerous.” Accordingly, concerns both 
about offensive weapons systems like the MX missile and budgetary 
concerns in an era of expanding deficits took precedence.
N ational Affairs  ·  W inter 2016
166
There is of course room for reasonable criticism of Moynihan on this 
score, as on others. Whether the Soviet Union was careening toward a 
cliff of its own disintegrative accord or whether Reagan shoved it over 
the edge remains a subject of debate. But Moynihan’s views were consis-
tent, not expedient. Moreover, since his youth he had considered them 
liberal. He told the New Republic in 1977, at his muscular Cold Warrior 
peak: “I’m a member of the [Americans for Democratic Action] genera-
tion: people who got out of the services after the Second World War and 
wanted to get into liberal politics. In New York, and I expect a lot of 
other places, the central struggle of the time was with the Stalinist left. 
ADA organized us, and upheld us.”
What is  a  moynihan Liber aL ?
What, then, shall we make of Moynihan’s pungent critiques of liberals, 
critiques accompanied by his frequent praise of conservative thinkers 
ranging from Burke to Oakeshott, Kristol to Strauss? 
This, after all, is someone who said that after the Great Society he 
“had considerably scaled down my expectations of what government 
could do about most things — in the early 1960s in Washington we 
thought we could do anything, and we found out different — and had 
acquired the discipline of not being too much impressed by clever-
seeming people.” Liberalism in that era, he complained, “lost a sense 
of limits.” He lectured Democrats in 1968 — in a volume edited by a 
Republican congressman, and, to add insult, entitled Republican 
Papers — that “somehow liberals have been unable to acquire from life 
what conservatives seem to be endowed with at birth, namely, a healthy 
skepticism of the powers of government to do good.” 
Citations to conservatives, meanwhile, pepper his writings. Moynihan 
studied at the London School of Economics around the time Michael 
Oakeshott arrived there, and he appears to have attended at least some of 
the latter’s lectures. Significantly, he deployed Oakeshott against both par-
ties, such as when he accused each of excessive scientism in the formation 
of social policy: “A larger possibility is that we are seeing at work in both 
‘liberal’ Democratic and ‘conservative’ Republican administrations the 
demon that Michael Oakeshott has identified as Rationalism — the great 
heresy of modern times.” (Again the quotation marks framing “liberal” 
and “conservative” are suggestive.) He quoted Burke at least two dozen 
times in his writings. He invoked Podhoretz against liberal doomsaying.
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Part of the explanation for all this is that he believed liberalism 
needed to be nourished by an internal critique from which, especially 
amid the moralism of the 1960s, it had insulated itself. About his 1976 run 
for Senate, he said, “I ran as a liberal willing to be critical of what liberals 
had done. If we did not do this, I contended, our liberalism would go 
soft.” Moreover, some conservatives have mistaken Moynihan’s capacious 
intellectual curiosity, which spanned not only a diversity of topics but 
also a diversity of perspectives, for political compatibility. Instead, his 
particular proclivity for associating with, reading, and quoting conser-
vative thinkers arose from a suppleness and habit of mind that actively 
sought disagreement — an aptitude largely, and sadly, lost not merely 
among statesmen but among scholars, a similarly insular profession.
In assessing Moynihan’s relationship to neoconservatism, the issue of 
party is inescapable as well. Whether because the movement has shifted, 
because the major political parties have realigned, or both, neoconserva-
tism is more monolithically Republican today than when Kristol wrote 
in 1976. There is also no question that the second generation of neocon-
servatives is less Burkean and more Wilsonian than the first.
But the explanation, ultimately, distills to this: Moynihan was nei-
ther a neoconservative nor a paleoliberal. Moynihan was Moynihan. 
He believed in government as an agent of good, but also in limitation 
as a condition of life. As he wrote in 1973: “Increasingly, it is what is 
known about life that makes it problematical. . . . The unexpected, the 
unforeseen: the public life of our age seems dominated by events of 
this cast.” He believed in a politics rooted in empirical circumstance 
rather than theoretical abstraction. He championed the subsidiary units 
of society — family, ethnic group, neighborhood. He respected society’s 
complexity, but also believed some problems required political and na-
tional solutions.
I have called this “Burkean liberalism.” But if the issue of Moynihan 
and the neoconservatives comes down to labels, perhaps a time may 
come when individuals of a certain bent, with a certain combination of 
beliefs, will describe themselves as “Moynihan liberals.” This would be 
as good a time as any.
